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Summary
The Affordable Care Act calls for significant cuts in reimbursements to insurers providing Medicare Advantage
(MA) coverage, which has been the most popular alternative to traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
Opponents of these cuts argue that they carry serious negative repercussions for seniors, and have lobbied
successfully to force their postponement. But research coming out of the Wharton School suggests that cuts
to MA reimbursements actually are unlikely to harm consumer welfare.
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As baby boomers retire, both the number 
of enrollees and the costs are expected 
to rise. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimates that Medicare spending 
will increase to 4.9% of GDP in 2038, a 
63% jump from 2013.2 While spending has 
slowed over the last few years, the Medicare 
program represents an increasing strain on 
the federal budget. Especially in the wake of 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the need to 
cut costs and develop innovative financing is 
more important than ever.
Medicare Advantage (MA) has been 
the most popular alternative to traditional 
fee-for-service (FFS) financing in the pro-
gram’s nearly 50 year history. In traditional 
FFS Medicare, the federal government 
pays hospitals and physicians directly for 
services. Under MA, the federal government 
pays private carriers on a per-member, per-
month basis to insure Medicare beneficia-
ries, who enroll voluntarily. Insurers have 
been able to attract consumers by adding a 
variety of benefits and lowering consumers’ 
share of the costs, compared with traditional 
Medicare fees. However, critics contend that 
the MA program actually costs the federal 
government more than traditional Medicare, 
because MA enrollees tend to be healthier 
than average and therefore would rack up 
much lower costs if enrolled in FFS. 
The ACA calls for cuts in reimburse-
ments to insurers providing MA coverage 
that would save the federal government 
$156 billion over the next nine years.3 This 
issue brief examines the potential impact of 
those cuts. 
WHO BENEFITS FROM MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE?
By AMANDA STARC
Medicare, the federal health insurance program for elderly 
Americans, covers 52 million people in the United States.1 
Because health care spending has increased dramatically since 
the program’s inception in 1965, the program has a large and 
growing impact on the federal budget. 
 
brief in brief
•	 The	Affordable	Care	Act	calls	for	signifi-
cant	cuts	in	reimbursements	to	insurers	
providing	Medicare	Advantage	(MA)	cover-
age,	which	has	been	the	most	popular	
alternative	 to	 traditional	 fee-for-service	
Medicare.
•	 Opponents	of	these	cuts	argue	that	they	
carry	serious	negative	repercussions	for	
seniors,	and	have	 lobbied	successfully	
to	force	their	postponement.		
•	 But	research	coming	out	of	the	Wharton	
School	suggests	that	cuts	to	MA	reim-
bursements	actually	are	unlikely	to	harm	
consumer	welfare.
•	 The	 research	 indicates	 that	higher	MA	
reimbursements	 do	 not	 translate	 into	
less	expensive	or	higher	quality	care	for	
consumers.		But	they	do	benefit	insurance	
firms,	which	see	higher	profits,	some	of	
which	they	channel	into	increased	advertis-
ing	to	encourage	more	people	to	enroll	
in	the	MA	plans	they	offer.
•	 While	lower	reimbursements	likely	would	
reduce	 insurance	firm	profitability,	 they	
would	substantially	improve	the	federal	
budget—without	negatively	 impacting	
the	quality	of	care	received	by	patients.
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE VS. 
TRADITIONAL MEDICARE 
MA plans, originally known as Medicare 
Part C plans, were created in the 1980s as a 
way to introduce to the Medicare program 
the choice, competition, and innovation 
typically associated with health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs).4 Since then, 
MA has been subject to changing regula-
tions and reimbursement rates relative to 
traditional Medicare. Perhaps as a result, 
the program’s popularity has fluctuated over 
time and across the country. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of the Medicare population 
that purchased MA plans, also called MA 
penetration rates, from 1999 to the present. 
The program covered 13% of Medicare 
beneficiaries in 2005 and 28% of Medi-
care enrollees in 2013. Similarly, Figure 2 
shows MA participation by state for 2013: 
for example, the program covered 39% of 
Medicare beneficiaries in Pennsylvania 
but only 16% of Medicare beneficiaries in 
neighboring New Jersey.
Typically, firms attract consumers by 
offering more comprehensive coverage than 
traditional Medicare provides. For example, 
traditional Medicare exposes beneficia-
ries to substantial cost-sharing, including 
a $1216 deductible for Part A (hospital) 
services in 2013 and 20% coinsurance for 
Part B (physician) services, without an 
out-of-pocket maximum. As a result, most 
Medicare beneficiaries buy some form of 
supplemental or additional health insurance, 
either through a former employer or from 
the individual market. MA is an example 
of a type of policy sold on the individual 
market (Medigap is another). In addition to 
offering lower cost-sharing, MA plans may 
also offer dental, vision, or drug coverage; 
the latter was especially valuable before the 
Medicare Part D program went into effect 
in 2006. 
On average, MA can be a very good 
financial deal for consumers. For example, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) estimates that an Inde-
pendence Blue Cross plan5 in Philadelphia 
County has a total yearly out-of-pocket 
cost – the amount the average beneficiary 
can expect to spend on medical care – of 
$3,950, as compared to $6,180 in traditional 
FFS Medicare. In exchange for lower cost-
sharing, the MA beneficiary typically has 
a narrower choice of doctors and hospitals. 
But for many consumers, this is a reasonable 
tradeoff. A number of the large, national 
insurers offer MA plans. United Healthcare 
sold 21% of total plans across the country 
in 2013; Blue Cross Blue Shield affiliates 
and Humana also had substantial national 
market share.6 Marketing, both directly to 
consumers and through agents and brokers, 
plays a potentially important role in driving 
market share. There is also some evidence 
that advertising may be used to attract 
healthier than average consumers.7
DOES THE ADDITIONAL COST 
OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
BENEFIT CONSUMERS?
While MA may substantially reduce 
financial risk for many Medicare ben-
eficiaries, there is some concern over the 
choices available to consumers. The market 
is largely controlled by a small number of 
insurers who advertise extensively and may 
attempt to select healthier than average 
beneficiaries. Insurers certainly have an 
incentive to select such beneficiaries, since 
the federal government pays insurers on a 
per member, per month basis, rather than 
reimbursing for the actual expenses that 
members incur for medical services. 
To reduce costs, the ACA has 
proposed large cuts to insurer reimburse-
ments, which the insurance industry has 
successfully protested. This raises a natural 
question: How much does additional 
 1 http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-
fact-sheet/
 2 http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44582
 3  http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43471
 4  http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-
fact-sheet/
 5  Keystone	65	HMO;	figures	obtained	from	the	Medicare	
Compare	tool
 6  ht tp : / /ka ise r fami l y foundat ion . f i l es .wordpress .
com/2013/06/8448.pdf
 7  http://kff.org/medicare/pitching-private-medicare-plans-
an-analysis-of/
 8  http://www.nber.org/papers/w19989.pdf?new_win-
dow=1
 9  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~nosal/MA_switching_6_12.
pdf
FIGURE 1:  TOTAL MEDICARE pRIVATE HEALTH pLAN ENROLLMENT, 1999-2014
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Note: Includes MSAs, cost plans, demonstration plans, and Special Needs Plans as well as other Medicare Advantage Plans.
Source: MPR/Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment files, 2008-2014, and MPR, “Tracking
Medicare Health and Prescription Drug Plans Monthly Report,” 1999-2007; enrollment numbers from March of the respective year,
with the exception of 2006, which is from April. http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/
money spent on MA reimbursements 
benefit consumers? 
More money for firms does not neces-
sarily improve the cost of plans or the 
quality of coverage for the public, according 
to recent research I co-authored with Mark 
Duggan and Boris Vabson from the Whar-
ton School of the University of Pennsylva-
nia. Our paper, titled “Who Benefits When 
the Government Pays More? Evidence from 
Medicare Advantage,” does find that higher 
reimbursement increases both patient 
enrollment and the number of insurance 
companies in the market. These increases 
benefit insurers more than consumers.
We examine a concept called economic 
incidence—essentially, measuring who (i.e., 
the supplier or the consumer) truly pays a 
tax or benefits from a subsidy. To measure 
the economic incidence of MA reimburse-
ments, we look across geographic areas with 
higher or lower payments—called bench-
marks—to insurers. The benchmark is the 
basis for the average payment per member, 
per month. Benchmarks reflect both the 
costs of traditional Medicare, which are 
likely to be correlated with demand for 
MA, and regulation. In order to establish 
causation, rather than just correlation, we 
use unique regulation in the MA market 
known as payment floors. These are the 
lowest amounts of reimbursement firms can 
receive from the government for provid-
ing care, intended to spur private firms to 
participate in the MA program. The govern-
ment established two payment floors, one 
for urban counties, which is approximately 
10.5% higher than the one for rural coun-
ties. A county changes from rural to urban 
when its associated metropolitan statisti-
cal area (MSA) goes from a population of 
249,999 residents to 250,000. While the 
average rural county is likely to be very dif-
ferent from the average urban county, those 
that are close to either side of this popula-
tion threshold are likely to be fairly similar. 
These are the counties the study compares. 
Figure 3 highlights rural and urban floors; 
during the 2006-2011 time period of the 
study, floor counties accounted for the 
majority of U.S. counties.
As an example of how this threshold 
works, consider two comparable Illinois 
counties, Peoria and Sangamon, whose 2008 
benchmarks were both set at the payment 
floor. Peoria County belongs to the Peoria, 
IL MSA with a population of 367,000, 
while Sangamon County belongs to the 
Springfield, IL MSA with a population of 
just 204,000. As a result, although these 
counties have similar per capita costs for 
traditional Medicare FFS coverage ($601 
for Peoria and $612 for Sangamon), the 
county-level benchmark of what firms were 
reimbursed in Peoria County was $772 
per month—corresponding to the urban 
floor rate—versus just $699 per month in 
neighboring Sangamon county—the rural 
floor rate.8
The study examines a number of related 
questions. First, are insurers more likely 
FIGURE 2:  SHARE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES ENROLLED IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE pLANS, 
By STATE, 2014
Note: Includes MSAs, cost plans, demonstration plans, and Special Needs Plans as well as other Medicare Advantage Plans.
Source: MPR/Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of CMS State/Country Market Penetration Files, 2014. http://kff.org/medicare/fact-
sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/
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FIGURE 3:  NATIONWIDE DISTRIBUTION OF FLOOR COUNTIES
Urban Floor
Non-Urban Floor
Non-Floor
to voluntarily sell MA plans in the more 
generously reimbursed urban floor counties 
than in rural floor counties? The answer is 
yes; on average, 1.9 additional firms enter 
the market in urban floor counties, where 
the benchmarks are higher. With more 
firms, there is substantially lower market 
concentration: there are more insurers com-
peting for customers in urban floor counties. 
Second, are more Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled in MA plans in counties with 
higher reimbursements? Again, the answer 
is yes; the MA participation rate nearly 
doubles in urban floor counties, an increase 
of 12 percentage points. For those who 
believe that MA is either more cost effective 
or a great deal for consumers on average, 
this is a good thing.
In addition to the number of firms and 
participants, the study examines prices. If, 
for the most part, consumers benefit from 
increased government spending on the MA 
program, we should see consumer premiums 
fall by about $73 per month—the increase 
in the subsidy—in urban floor counties. 
However, MA reimbursements from the 
federal government are so high that many 
firms charge no premium beyond what 
beneficiaries pay for Medicare Part B. We 
find little effect on premiums. Instead, firms 
could reduce copayments or deductibles. The 
Medicare program publishes estimated out-
of-pocket costs for each MA plan. If firms 
reduce deductibles or copayments, the esti-
mated out-of-pocket costs also fall. These 
costs are $10 per month lower in urban floor 
counties than in rural floor counties, but this 
result is not statistically significant. While 
this suggests that consumers receive some 
benefit from higher government payments, 
the part of the subsidy that passes through 
to consumers is far from the full amount. 
While we find little evidence that plans 
are more generous in urban floor counties, 
financial features are only one dimension of 
insurance that a beneficiary may value. Con-
sumers worry about access to doctors and 
hospitals, which are affected by insurer net-
works. They also might care about adminis-
trative aspects of plans, such as the quality 
of customer service or an insurer’s reputa-
tion. Finally, Medicare beneficiaries may 
look for which MA plans can help them 
manage their own health care effectively.
To examine these dimensions of plans, 
the study looks at survey data from the 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Pro-
viders and Systems (CAHPS), performed 
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ). The CAHPS includes 
survey data from about 160 thousand Medi-
care recipients each year.
Do consumers in urban counties like 
their doctors more? No; quality ratings are 
statistically the same between urban and 
rural counties. Do consumers in urban floor 
counties go to the doctor more often or 
like their specialists more than consum-
ers in rural floor counties? No again; the 
estimates are statistically the same. Finally, 
do consumers in urban floor counties report 
that they are in better health? No again; the 
results are statistically identical.
To summarize, the results show that 
higher reimbursements lead to higher MA 
participation rates, which explains some of 
the variation across the country and over 
time. More firms enter the market, thus the 
market appears more competitive, but prices 
do not fall substantially and quality does 
not increase. 
Consumers may not benefit from higher 
reimbursements for a couple of reasons. 
First, consumers in urban floor counties may 
be sicker and more expensive to insure than 
those in rural floor counties due to insur-
ance companies being selective. However, 
the research indicates that this is unlikely. 
First, MA payments are adjusted for risk, 
and enrollees look no more risky in urban 
than in rural floor counties. Second, to 
account for the results, new enrollees would 
have to be about 30% more expensive to 
insure, which seems unlikely.
If firms being selective cannot explain 
these results, a lack of competition in the 
market might. Insurers may be able to con-
trol prices in markets where they have an 
advantage over competing firms. Theoreti-
cally, this would explain why plan generosity 
does not increase. Two facts support this 
argument. First, larger publicly traded insur-
ers experienced abnormally high returns 
when proposed cuts to the MA program 
were delayed by the government. Second, 
firms have advertised extensively, which 
according to the study explains the increase 
in MA enrollment in urban floor counties.
The results indicate that firms spend 
on average about $5 more per Medicare 
beneficiary for television spot advertising 
in urban floor counties than in rural floor 
counties. While this is not a large amount, 
it is almost certainly underestimates the 
total resources dedicated to plan marketing. 
This can help explain why so many benefi-
ciaries in urban floor counties choose MA 
over traditional Medicare, even though the 
plans themselves do not appear substantially 
more generous. 
The research indicates that an addi-
tional dollar of federal spending on the 
MA program translates into, at most, only 
40 cents of additional financial benefit for 
consumers. Similarly, quality is unchanged, 
yet advertising spending increases. This 
has important implications for policy, and 
the results should play into the decisions 
regarding proposed cuts to the Medicare 
Advantage program. 
pOLICy IMpLICATIONS
The ACA’s proposed cuts to the MA pro-
gram are designed, in part, to fund insur-
ance expansions in Medicaid and subsidized 
exchange plans. Proponents of these cuts 
argue that the program overpays insurers 
relative to traditional Medicare. Crit-
ics argue that the cuts would have serious 
negative repercussions for seniors, and have 
organized advertising campaigns and lob-
bying efforts to postpone or even abandon 
the cuts altogether. Indeed, a few weeks ago, 
after facing substantial lobbying and politi-
“The research indicates that 
an additional dollar of federal 
spending on the MA program 
translates into, at most, only 
40 cents of additional financial 
benefit for consumers.”
cal pressure, CMS announced that rather 
than cutting MA rates by 1.9% for 2015, 
rates would increase by 0.4%. 
Our findings indicate that cuts of up to 
10% are unlikely to harm consumer welfare 
by increasing premiums or out-of-pocket 
costs or lowering the quality of care. By 
contrast, cuts in MA reimbursements may 
cause firms to advertise less and leave less 
profitable markets, which could lead to 
lower enrollment in MA plans. 
While each dollar spent by the govern-
ment on MA may not greatly improve 
the value for Medicare beneficiaries, those 
dollars spent on MA can lower the aver-
age consumer costs when measured against 
traditional Medicare. The mere fact that 
consumers are more likely to choose MA 
plans implies that they prefer them to tra-
ditional Medicare. Therefore, policy makers 
might be concerned that cuts could result 
in declining enrollment. However, a great 
deal of evidence suggests that consumers 
will stick with what they know or what they 
have done in the past,9 which may mean less 
of an impact on reducing enrollment. 
Ultimately, the study predicts that 
lower reimbursements are likely to reduce 
insurance firm profitability but improve the 
federal budget. Lower reimbursement rates 
are likely to save the federal government 
money in two ways. Obviously, lower reim-
bursements mean beneficiaries enrolled in 
MA cost less. Furthermore, assuming MA is 
more expensive than traditional FFS, lower 
enrollment in MA would reduce the overall 
costs of the program.
More broadly, the MA program high-
lights a critical issue facing policy makers 
and practitioners in a post-health reform 
world. As the United States builds on its 
existing private insurance system with 
publicly financed subsidies and increasing 
regulation, the government must set rules 
that encourage private insurers to partici-
pate while reducing the burden on taxpay-
ers. Similarly, practitioners must find a way 
to create value in an evolving marketplace. 
These challenges exist not only in the 
Medicare program, but in the newly formed 
health insurance marketplaces as well. 
Continuing dialogue among practitioners, 
academics, and policymakers should spur 
future research and better policy in this area.
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